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The	Shared	Island	initiative	is	not	just	about	practical
policy,	but	about	national	identity	post-Brexit
In	this	post,	Etain	Tannam	(Trinity	College	Dublin)	explores	the	prospects	for	the	Shared	Island	project,	in	light	of
the	Brexit	process	and	evolving	Irish	attitudes	to	Britishness.
The	taoiseach	Micheál	Martin	formally	launched	the	Shared	Island	initiative	on	October	22nd,	backed	by	a	new	unit
in	the	Department	of	the	Taoiseach.	It	has	received	various	negative	critiques:	for	some	unionists,	the	Shared
Island	initiative	contains	no	new	ideas	and/or	it	is	a	means	to	a	united	Ireland	by	stealth.	For	some	nationalists	and
unionists,	it	is	solely	motivated	by	the	Fianna	Fáil’s	electoral	aim	of	undermining	support	for	Sinn	Féin,	following	that
party’s	success	in	the	2020	Irish	General	Election.	For	some	nationalists	by	emphasising	reconciliation	not
unification,	it	is	a	sell-out.	However	contrary	to	all	these	claims,	the	taoiseach’s	speech	highlighted	just	how
fundamental	is	the	new	initiative.
The	key	significance	is	not	just	about	practical	policy,	but	identity	–	a	self-critical	reappraisal	of	who	we	are	on	the
island	and	what	futures	we	seek	post-Brexit.	A	core	point	in	the	Taoiseach’s	speech	was	the	need	to	examine
	‘what	does	it	mean	to	have	British	or	Irish	identity	on	the	island	today?	Of	particular	note	and	not	stated	before	by
any	Irish	leader	he	stated	that	he	‘would	also	like	to	see	more	reflection	and	engagement	in	the	South,	so	that	we
look	at	preconceptions,	mutual	understandings,	challenges	and	opportunities	for	our	shared	future	on	the	island’.
He	called	for	probing	of	‘some	of	the	simplistic	narratives	about	what	we	have	all	come	through,	which	have
emerged	on	both	sides	of	the	border’.
Arguably,	self-reflection	in	Ireland	on	the	Irish	narrative	of	history,	of	unionism,	of	Britishness	and	of	England	is	long
over-due.	A	fraught	and	often	tragic	history	under	British	rule,	but	also	after	it,	has	led	to	a	tendency	among	some
media	commentators	and	public	to	have	a	preoccupation	with	distant	history	leading	to	a	labelling	of	the	UK,	and,
as	the	taoiseach	pointed	out,	a	weakness	in	objective	historical	analysis.	Brexit	has,	of	course,	provided	easy
fodder	for	such	labelling.
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There	are	no	public	opinion	polls	on	Irish	attitudes	to	the	UK	and	no	systematic	content	analysis	of	media
narratives,	but	Brexit	seems	to	have	exposed	and	heightened	latent	prejudices.	In	2019,	a	public	row	and	bitter
rhetoric	that	followed	the	Irish	government’s	announcement	to	commemorate	those	Royal	Irish	Constabulary	men
who	died	during	the	Irish	War	of	Independence	showed	how	historic	tensions	had	not	vanished	and	the	event	was
cancelled.	The	RIC	comprised	the	Black	and	Tan	recruits	from	England	remembered	still	in	Ireland	as	exceptionally
ruthless,	but	it	also	comprised	Irish	recruits.	The	Black	and	Tans	were	primarily	1st	World	War	veterans	and	often
deeply	traumatised	themselves.	The	government	hoped	to	remember	all	the	dead	from	both	sides.	While	the	then
Taoiseach,	Leo	Vardakar	argued	that	‘we	should	be	mature	enough	as	a	State	to	acknowledge	all	aspects	of	our
past’,	other	Ministers	said	that	the	RIC	was	a	part	of	Ireland’s	former	colonial	past	and	should	not	be	remembered.
In	addition,	commentaries	of	the	Brexit	saga	were	at	times	reported	in	a	triumphalist	manner.	Frequently	Brexit	was
explained	completely	by	English,	or	British	imperialist	hangovers	(not	for	example	by	socioeconomic	inequality	as
argued	by	Labour	MP	Hillary	Benn).	Many	commentators	often	made	large	generalisations	and	failed	to
acknowledge	that	nearly	half	the	UK	population	voted	to	remain	in	the	EU.	One	journalist	in	the	Irish	Times	called
for	‘British’	self-reflection	on	identity	and	stated	that:	‘…The	British	have	been	gaslighting	each	other	and
themselves	for	generations.	This	is	the	personal	propaganda	cycle	that	colonialism	instigates’.	She	continued	‘when
was	the	UK	respected	around	the	world,	beyond	superficial	Anglophilia,	which	is	–	red	flag	–	primarily	an	American
pursuit?’.
Negative	portrayals	of	the	UK	or	England	often	coincide	with	a	contrast	of	Ireland’s	modernity	and	success.	Brexit
combined	with	Irish	liberalisation	and	growth	of	confidence	has,	according	to	the	above	commentator	in	an	earlier
article,	contributed	to	increased	anti-British	sentiment:	‘This	is	the	first	modern	Irish	generation	that	is
unselfconsciously	patriotic,	embracing	a	benign	yet	passionate	cultural	nationalism	that	is	non-sectarian’.
In	the	New	York	Times	another	Irish	journalist	in	an	article	entitled	’I	Didn’t	Hate	the	English		–	Until	Now’	states:	‘In
the	midst	of	all	this,	I’ve	noticed	a	tonal	shift	in	the	way	I	and	other	Irish	people	speak	about	the	English.	Our	anger
is	more	sincere.	We	are	more	ready	to	call	them	out	on	all	those	centuries	of	excess,	more	likely	to	object	to
those…pink-faced	dinasours	who	still	perceive	us	as	their	inferiors’.
These	examples	are	not	to	imply	at	all	that	there	is	rampant	anti-Britishness	in	Ireland.	The	visit	of	Queen	Elizabeth
to	Ireland	in	2011,	the	first	official	visit	of	a	British	monarch	in	100	years	met	with	a	deeply	warm	welcome.
Moreover,	other	commentators	provide	balanced	portraits.	For	example,	one	seasoned	Irish	Times	journalist
argued	that:	‘Sneering	at	the	foolishness	of	the	British	people	and	taking	pleasure	at	the	political	contortions
required	of	Theresa	May	and	her	ministers	to	make	the	best	of	a	bad	lot	is	not	simply	unneighbourly	but	potentially
dangerous.	It	is	the	mirror	image	of	the	attitude	of	those	in	the	UK	who	demonised	the	EU	for	so	long’.
In	addition,	despite	the	immense	strain	caused	by	Brexit	and	its	highly	negative	impact	on	Ireland,	Irish	politicians
have	been	careful	to	avoid	anti-British	rhetoric.	For	example,	in	an	impressive	and	reflective	interview	on	BBC
Radio	4,	Simon	Coveney,	the	Minister	for	Foreign	Affairs	emphasised	the	close	cultural	and	family	ties	between
Ireland	and	the	UK,	including	his	own	personal	ties.
However,	the	apparent	increased	incidence	of	negative	stereotyping,	apparent	unawareness	among	some	that
negative	labelling	of	Britishness,	just	like	stereotyping	of	any	ethnic	group,	is	incompatible	with	a	multicultural	and
tolerant	society	and	that	it	is	clearly	noted	by	unionists,	makes	Micheál	Martin’s	emphasis	on	probing	identity	in
Ireland	and	understanding	different	narratives	of	history	all	the	more	crucial.	According	to	Arthur	Aughey,	‘for	many
unionists,	an	Irish	vision	of	English/British	constitutional,	cultural,	and	imaginative	backwardness	is	conjured	as	the
truth	of	the	contemporary	UK.	It	is	now	the	formerly	patronising	British	who	have	been	‘wrong-footed’	by	history’
and	the	Irish	who	have	the	upper	hand’.	In	other	words,	according	to	Aughey	there	is	a	unionist	perception	that	Irish
commentators	tend	to	view	Ireland	as	always	on	the	right	side	of	history	and	the	UK	and	unionism	as	always	on	the
wrong	side.	Thus,	for	many	unionists,	reconciliation	on	the	island	is	hindered	by	weak	self-reflection	among	some	in
Ireland	and	an	appearance	of	smugness	towards	British	citizens.
There	is,	of	course,	simplistic	reductionism,	and	negative	labelling	of	Ireland	in	some	unionist	quarters	in	Northern
Ireland.	Similarly,	since	Brexit,	stereotyping	of	Ireland	has	also	increased	in	some	English	media,	for	example,
personal	attacks	made	on	the	former	Taoiseach	Leo	Vardakar.	However,	while	there	is	awareness	in	Northern
Ireland	and	in	Britain	of	identity	issues,	in	general,	there	appears	to	be	less	awareness	in	Ireland	that	it	too	has	not
yet	left	identity	politics	behind.
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The	Shared	Island	launch	was	followed	the	next	day	by	the	former	DUP	leader	Peter	Robinson’s	proposal	to
establish	a		think	tank	on	the	future	of	the	Union.	Paradoxically,	the	two	initiatives	may	well	complement	each	other
in	the	future.	Robinson,	quoting	Arlene	Foster,	calls	for	unionists	to		‘make	the	Union	more	appealing	to	everyone	in
our	society’.	Although	rooted	in	different	ideologies,	both	initiatives	potentially	mark	a	watershed	in	the	development
of	nationalism	and	unionism	on	the	island	by	ceasing	to	view	the	future	through	‘the	prism’	of	the	past.
It	is	early	days,	but	Micheál	Martin	in	emphasising	the	need	for	self-reflection	on	identity	and	history	on	both	sides
of	the	border,	not	just	as	a	‘Northern	Irish’	issue,	has	launched	a	brave	initiative	that	hopefully	will	achieve	positive
relations	in	the	post-Brexit	decades	to	come.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	Brexit,	nor	of	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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